A Eureka Moment?

Today, I ran across an interesting piece by Jamal Elias, who is a professor of Religious Studies at Penn. The whole thing is a worth a read, and he makes a lot of good points. But aside from the current controversy, two of the points raised it made me consider something in a completely new light.

The first is this:

Almost invariably, the rich were the sole possessors of these rare, expensive books and, as is often the case, the rules of the palace differed from those of the street. For this reason, the art and book collections of the elite probably had little influence on the religious practices of the majority, and most surviving Islamic talismans and relics in mass circulation don’t depict Muhammad or other religious figures.

And this is the second:

Such groups are always publicly opposed to any and all forms of visual representation of Muhammad – just as they are to many other aspects of Muslim life, such as visiting shrines, religious music and dance and female participation in public life.

The point about elites being different is pretty much self explanatory, and there is often disapproval of the antics of the rich. It was only when juxtaposed with visiting shrines, which, in my understanding is a popular, folkloric practice, that I had the breakthrough; is Salafism a middle-class phenomenon?

Much has been written about the growth of the middle class and Victorian morality. And part of what drove the growth of the middle class was the Industrial Revolution, which caused migration to urban areas, and therefore dislocation for the newly arrived, formerly rural populations.

For instance, in The Making of Victorian Values: Decency and Dissent in Britain: 1789-1837, Ben Wilson argues that the new focus on morality was in part fueled by fear of losing economic status through the consequences of improper behavior. Unsurprisingly, he also mentions the influence of charismatic preachers.

Since the Second World War, and with the accompanying wave of independence, rural to urban migration has been widespread in much of the Muslim world. And despite widespread unemployment, there has been a rise in the standard of living, and in the expectations of the population. Additionally, post-independence governments have increased educational opportunities in ways that echo similar developments in 19th Century Europe.

These kind of comparisons should always be taken with a grain of salt, especially since they might neglect other, equally important factors. Nevertheless, I think this is an interesting prism through which to view social developments in the contemporary greater Middle East.

What does Justice Mean?

When I taught in France, we did a lesson on holidays, and I told my students about Kwanzaa. They were confused by a holiday that was neither national nor religious, but cultural. I explained that part of the idea behind Kwanzaa was for African-Americans to celebrate their African heritage, which had been suppressed by their experience of slavery and oppression. One of my students was really stuck.

"Mademoiselle," he asked, "How did slavery just end? Weren't the black people angry? Did any of them try to seek revenge?"

It was a pretty heavy-hitting question from an 8-year-old. And I wasn't sure how to answer. What I said was that slavery may have ended on paper, but the mistreatment of  back people didn't just go away and that that wound of oppression was still fresh and not scarred over. That was a heavy answer for a class full of 8-year-olds.

Race relations and discrimination are heavy topics. That's probably part of why people deny the issues or avoid real discussions. Although denial and avoidance are themselves manifestations of privilege; people of color can't take a break from being themselves and the daily struggle of existence.

Denial is evident when people try to find fault with victims, like Eric Garner or Michael Brown, and search for any excuse that will deflect from the fact that they were killed. Because I am female, it made me think of the criticism and victim-blaming that come up when a rape victim comes forward.

Being female helps open my mind to the experience of people of color. It doesn't make me fully understand them, because the experiences are not the same. That's the problem with taking #BlackLivesMatter and trying to turn it into #AllLivesMatter. All lives do matter, but black people, specifically, are hurting. Black people's voices need to be heard.

I consider myself to be very lucky in having many friends who are active and principled. I see them sharing useful articles and photos from protests on Facebook. I admire their commitment. Some of my friend are white, some are black, some are mixed, or Asian, or Hispanic, or Arab. It's important for all of us to come together, to hear what black people are saying, to try and understand what is going on, and to work to create a better, more equitable society.

I think it's helpful to pass along something a friend shared. People get very hung up when privilege enters the discussion. They protest loudly that they are not bad people, don't have bad intentions. That's missing the point on what privilege means. It doesn't mean you are bad person, deliberately, intentionally hurting people who are different from yourself. What it does mean is that a system exists; a system that privileges some people while it disadvantages others. What that means, is that while laws are supposed to apply equally to everyone in theory, their application in practice is unjust. 

A lot of focus in the debates has been about police. The state authority that the police represent can be problematic when large groups of people don't feel that it is legitimate. When people are angry about the actions of the police, it also doesn't mean that policemen are irredeemably bad, bloodthirsty racists. However, they are tools of a system that is disproportionately harsh towards people of color.

Something important to realize, for observers as well as the police, is a point in the guide my friend shared:

Do:  Help white people understand our “mutual interest” (ie what is our stake) with POC in overturning a racist, oppressive system.
Don’t: Tell white people that they are “helping,” “supporting,” etc. POC.

The continued oppression of people of color is something that damages our entire society. When our system holds people back, and prevents them for achieving their full potential, we will all eventually pay the price. There are, unfortunately, people who are actually dangerous and malicious in our society. And we also need to deal with our terrible gun violence problem. These problems feed off each other. But in order to deal with them, and for the police to fulfill their mission to "protect and serve," we need to establish a baseline of trust.

If our ears and our hearts are open, we should be hearing what black people are saying; that they can't breathe. That the problem is so bad, and so pressing, that it takes their breath away. Justice is recognizing that everyone deserves to be able to breathe.

Change in Algeria through women's eyes

Anyone who is interested in Algeria or in women's issues in Arab World should take a look at this site. It's a collaboration between El Watan and TV5Monde and is well done. The women who are featured are a diverse group and situated throughout the country. It's important, in order to get a better picture of the stakes in Algeria, to hear perspectives from different age groups and social classes.

There were several of the portraits that were particularly enjoyable:  Maissa Bey in Sidi bel Abbes and  Abla Moulay in Tamanrasset. Having lived through many decades and witnessed the changes in Algeria themselves, their recollections were food for thought.

Abla Moulay is a farmer and lives a life that is almost like a glimmer of the past. She reflects on how work has changed in her lifetime and how although she carries on with her business, it is unlikely that young people will continue the tradition. And Maissa Bey, a writer, explains how attitudes changed when women began working in factories.

Their perspective on how society has changed in the face of economic pressures ties in with a theme I studied during the spring semester. I was lucky enough to take an Introduction to Cultural Anthropology class with Brian Spooner at the University of Pennsylvania. The main point was that culture increases in complexity with increased interaction (which is usually tied to increase in population).

Thus it is not at all surprising that culture in Algeria (and the rest of North Africa) should have changed a great deal in the second half of the 20th Century, as populations have increased around the globe.

Famed anthropologist  Germaine Tillion addressed some of these issues as they relate to gender in her work My Cousin, My Husband, where she investigates Mediterranean endogamy. One's personal feelings aside, she demonstrates that the system made sense in a society that placed great emphasis on land holdings and extended families lived in close proximity. When looking at the past (or at other cultures) we often forget the context, but she points out that in the past, when a woman married a cousin, he was most likely someone with whom she had grown up and whose mother she knew well. With the movement of populations, this set of circumstances no longer existed and when marriages attempted to consolidate land holdings, women were then more vulnerable to abuse from their in-laws.

Remaining within the anthropological framework, in the very fine book Asking and Listening by Paul Bohannan and Dirk van der Elst, makes the point that anthropologists do better work when they study two societies other than their own in comparison, because being part of a society makes it harder to evaluate.

I am not a fan of focusing on outward religious indicators like headcoverings or beards. It's overly simplistic and collapses complex phenomena. However, Maissa Bey's description of the pressure the female factory workers felt to wear headscarves is instructive. The key point here is that it was an adaptation to changing circumstances. As the pace of change has been accelerating, more adaptations may be needed and societies are not always well-equipped to handle them.

There are many changes taking place today all over the world, including in the US. However, it is hard to perceive them while they are happening to us. To better understand, I think it is useful to look at change in a historical perspective.

Before I go any further, I want to make a point. Saying that one society is more complex than another is not a value judgment. It also does not mean that the individuals that make up the society have more or less worth than members of another society.

Since complexity is defined in part by greater interaction, often through population growth, the growth of urban areas plays a key role. In this light, examining the Industrial Revolution may help us to understand how change effects culture and society.

As people flocked to cities, the numbers not only strained infrastructure but existing social patterns as well. While greater wealth was not evenly distributed, the growth of the middle class meant that a large group of people found themselves outside both peasant and elite structures. The rise of Victorian morality can be seen as a response to this vacuum.

In the same way, the pressure to conform to conservative social mores that Maissa Bey describes can be seen as a response to a new category of working women, whose presence was destabilizing to the established order. This is where Abla Moulay's portrait is interesting. In some ways, she represents a holdover from a different time. While she works, her work is within the framework of an established category, agriculture. 

But when examining women's work in the market economy, we often forget that before the Industrial Revolution, working for wages was very rare. Thus, gendered attitudes toward it are not reflective of some age old mentality, but are themselves and adaptation to a new situation.

The takeaway is that adaptation is something that happens, and it is not necessarily part of a plan or an agenda. Additionally, since change can be threatening, the adaptations to them often anchor themselves within a familiar framework, like religion. Understanding the (re)appearance of outward religious signs in North Africa (and elsewhere in the region) as part of a process of adaptation to increased cultural complexity is a useful step to making the phenomenon less "othered."

Thoughts on the situation in Iraq

Currently, pundits, politicians and the press are all worked up about the ISIS advance on Baghdad. However, it's important to see what is important to Iraq and what is important to US interests.

The first question is hard to answer because Iraq is so divided. And of course, "Iraq" is also a 20th century creation, conjured up by colonial powers and the Hashemite royal family. Perhaps it is not surprising that those divisions did not just disappear. Nevertheless, unrest in Iraq puts Iraqis at risk, whether they are the targets of reprisals, families who have fled, or women who are told not to leave their houses. The most important thing is for people to be safe. And yet, close behind safety is the need for justice and fair treatment.

This difficulty is clear in Iraq, and is also part of the problem in Syria; how do populations live together when they are riven by ethnic and sectarian divisions?

There are two keys to ensuring a workable modus vivendi: ensuring that the administration includes all groups, and providing fair treatment. Despite being a dictator, Saddam Hussein did not rely solely on members of his own group to fill the ranks. Additionally, the Baath party not only looked to a common identity that was applicable to many groups, but provided a power structure outside ethnic, tribal or religious affiliation. The current government is a Shiite-dominated outfit. This, compounded with the  exclusion of Baath party operatives, created a void that the Sunni jihadist groups have filled.

Proposals to divide Iraq often meet with skepticism or even outrage. And carving out independent fiefdom may be premature. However, a more federal structure might help to calm tensions and allow Iraqis to feel more invested in their local governments. Nationalism and it cousins are difficult creatures; on the one hand, people should be able to choose their leaders but, on the other hand, those leaders must serve the whole population, not only the majority. Reducing the scope from the national to the local level can help, to the extent that people may be better able to understand their common interests when they are right before their eyes.

Unfortunately, the Sunni-Shiite fault-line has deep roots. And that, in itself, is a reason for the US and the international community to be wary of intervention. It is not wise to take sides.

However, by the same token, it is not wise to continue the poor relations with Iran that have characterized the past 30 years. In that light, Afghanistan was a missed opportunity. A different response to the Taliban, one that focused on drug interdiction with a sidelight on the mistreatment of ethnic minorities, like the Hazara, could have paved the way for better relations and humanitarian cooperation with Iran.

Aside from these concerns, and the fear of spillover and exported terrorism, Iraq is not the US's backyard or responsibility. The invasion and occupation of Iraq was costly, with very little payoff, and there is no reason to believe a second act would be any different. Any decisions should be based on sober analysis, not on wounded pride or the desire to finish the job, simply because it was begun. Further, other countries, given the US's poor track record in the region, may not be eager to cooperate.

Finally, it is very difficult to look on and see suffering and chaos. However, that in itself is not a justification for action. Iraq has difficult issues to address, but Iraqis must be able to address them if they hope to advance and build a better future.

Thoughts about ideology and economy

Veteran jouralist Masood Farivar has an interesting opinion piece in the New York Times, reflecting on foreign fighters in  Syria. Farivar explains that the motives of foreign fights kept them apart from the Afghans fighting agains the Soviets.

Their foreign tongues, their strange garb and mien and, above all, their reasons for fighting kept them apart. Their novice’s clumsiness drew giggles; their religious dogmatism baffled us. And their suicidal embrace of martyrdom caused revulsion.

He then examines the motivations some fighters have, but while acknowledging they may be complex, he does not find them to pose a threat to the US. 

This is interesting to hear. There's been a lot of talk about the threat posed by returning fighters, while has struck me as overblown. Or, that it's the wrong way to look at the issue.

Farivar dismisses the idea of typing foreign fighters, yet it does have some utility.

In an attempt to understand the foreign fighters, some Western experts have crafted caricatures — the revenge-seeker, the status-seeker, the identity-seeker and so on — but the legion of fighters with varied and often overlapping motives defy easy stereotypes.

Certainly, real people will not fit nicely into one of these profiles, but understanding the issue through this lens offers some insight. In Anthropology, it is important to differentiate between individual change, often linked to the life cycle,  and larger, cultural change. So, we can observe that the phenomenon of men (and women) going abroad to fight for a cause is nothing new. A good example is the Spanish Civil War, which attracted soldiers worldwide. A similar comparison can also be made with the wave of leftist guerrilla violence throughout Europe in the 1970s and 80s (Baader-Meinhof, Brigate Rosse, Action Directe). Jihadist groups can be viewed as the current manifestation, not necessarily a unique or different threat.

My argument is that the problem is not young people in search of meaning, but conditions that allow the general population  to sympathize with them. Thus focusing on returning fighters, or even on the threat of lone wolves, is not a particularly useful endeavor. Instead, if states are genuinely interested in cutting down on violence, their best course of action is to right the wrongs that most concern their populations.

Looking at the above examples, one may notice that both coincide with periods of economic turmoil (the Great Depression, Oil Crisis/stagflation). I don't wish to reduce a complex situation to a numbers game, but as Bill Clinton famously said "It's the economy, stupid." Thus, when people suffer economically and concerned about inequality, this kind of movement seems more attractive. 

And here's why Farivar's article is relevant to this blog's theme. Many commentators have speculated on the mayhem that returning fighters could cause in the Maghreb countries. In Tunisia especially, where the population is less used to this kind of violence, tensions run high. But I maintain that the most serious problems in Tunisia are not religious or political, but economic. Similar arguments could be made relative to the inequalities in Morocco. I'm not sure if the same can be said for Algeria, and would welcome feedback.

Cultural Preservation, Collaboration, ...Colonialism?

The New York Times ran a piece about the National Museum in Afghanistan. While your blogger whole-hardheartedly sympathizes with the conservators working so hard to put objects back together, the way the article was presented posed several problems.

The first was the harping on the role of the Taliban in destroying cultural property. The story of the Bamiyan Buddhas is well known, and the idea of destroying centuries old treasures turns the stomach, but focusing on the Taliban obscures and downplays other threats to cultural property. In fact, the article does detail some of the looting:

The looted objects have also been returning, as word has gotten around to customs agents worldwide about how to identify Afghan artifacts. In recent years, Interpol and Unesco have teamed up with governments around the world to interdict and return at least 857 objects — some of them priceless, like 4,000-year-old Bactrian princess figurines that had disappeared from the National Museum. Another 11,000 objects have been returned after being seized by the border authorities at Afghanistan’s own frontiers.

Of course, some of the people destroying certain objects may have been the very same people turning a profit on stolen goods. After all, the Taliban does not hesitate to profit from drug trafficking, even though using drugs is generally considered to be forbidden. Whoever is stealing from the Museum and other institutions, it is a threat that will remain, with or within the Taliban. 

The next troubling point was the emphasis placed on the team from the University of Chicago. Having worked on a museum collection-focused project that included Chicago, the issue is not their expertise or professionalism. Rather, the problem is minimizing the other international teams, and even more importantly, the Afghani professionals. For instance, why don't the French archeological  teams, who apparently did the majority of the work, deserve to be mentioned by name? 

Minimzing the contributions of the Afghani team is an even greater problem. Consider this man:

Afterward, people like Abdullah Hakimzada, a restorer who has spent the past 33 years working at the museum, were on hand to sweep up the fragments of the objects that the Taliban smashed — sorting many of them hurriedly into sacks and boxes that later would help the reassembly work.

Imagine spending more than three decades, almost all of it during wartime, working at something that requires great skill, concentration, and more than likely, great personal sacrifice. The others mentioned by name in the article (Mohammad Yahyeh Muhibzada and Omara Khan Masoudi) likely demonstrate similar commitment and Mr. Muhibzada (the archivist) probably has specialized training. The write-up seemed to overly exoticize the Afghan Museum and to paint its staff as colorful characters, rather than professionals. 

This view has been overly present in reporting about looting and museums, as reported in the NYT and elsewhere. It's easy to draw a parallel with the Timbuktu manuscripts. And it taps into an attitude toward cultural property that assumes the residents of the countries from which is comes are unable to appreciate its worth and need an outsider to do the work or make them realize its importance.

The reality is more complicated than that. From a strictly technical viewpoint, their training and materials may not measure up to the prevailing international standard. Many of these workers are acutely aware of this. And they are also aware of the threats to these treasured objects in dangerous situations. Refering to objects on tour in Europe, Mr. Hakimzada said, "I personally hope they never return. At least where they are now, we know they are safe.” 

And yet, they are equally aware of their importance. Mr Muhibzada's statement is clear: “Archaeological artifacts are our national identity. It’s our national responsibility to protect them so future generations will know who we are and who we were.”

The Western view of Afghanistan (and other current war zones, like Mali) is a reductive one, composed mostly of tribesmen, misery and lawlessness. Calling the Museum's collections "relics" plays into this idea. It assumes that the culture in museums is the only one worth saving. As I am lucky enough to work in a large university library, I am aware of the works of literature that Afghan authors have managed to publish over the past fifteen years. Thanks to Twitter, I know of many courageous people in Mali who are tremendously dedicated both to expanding education and to preserving cultural artifacts. 

Certainly, these countries suffer from poverty, war, and lack of educational and cultural resources. The people there do not need outsiders to point out these deficits. But they also don't need to be viewed as uncultured and backward. In the United States (or in France, where I have also lived) there may be a high level of official culture, but there are plenty of social problems as well. It's unfair and arrogant to adopt such a condescending attitude towards the cultural production and preservation happening elsewhere in the world.

Some of the other problems with the article are not speciic to the situation in Afghanistan, but are instead gripes with the way the media portrays museums and conservation. And let's pay attention to the term I used; restoration and conservation are not really the same thing. 

Since I have been working since my undergraduate days in related fields, I may be especially sensitive to how this work is described. And yet, insisting on employing the correct term is directly germane to the issues raised in this article. Conservators subscribe to a code of ethics, they do not put something in an object that was not there before, nor do they intentionally erase anything original. And they treat every object with the same respect, from priceless national treasures to family documents. And this outlook was clear from the comments made by the National Museum's staff.

Finally, it is important to address the idea of professional exchange and collaboration as it was portrayed in the article and more widely in the field. Differing levels of professional training exist around the globe. It is wonderful to be able to benefit from other practitioners' expertise and I know personally of wonderful collaborations that have taken place around the world. However, I am also aware of others that have gone less well. In order to be successful, it is imperative to approach the situation with the right attitude. An experienced practitioner can share his or her skills, but everyone brings something to the plate. The contribution of the Chicago and French teams is important, but the Afghan staff are not empty vessels.

This is something about which I have very strong feelings. I hope to see less of this hierarchical, one-directional understanding of Culture, and instead see a more inclusive view emerge. I believe that this change in attitude may also serve to diminish future destruction of cultural property, by breaking down unnecessary barriers and feelings of resentment from people who have felt slighted.
 

Taking a Break/Une petite pause

This blog has been silent for quite some time now, not because there is nothing to say, but in fact because there is too much. The events taking place in the Maghreb region (and in the Sahel) have led me to see that I am lacking some background information that would allow me (and many others) to understand current developments more completely. Therefore, I am embarking on a new adventure. Since I have recently gotten a new position at a university library, I have access to a wealth of works on every imaginable topic. I will choose and review those that are useful to readers who share my interests. Keep an eye out for some to be posted shortly and hopefully, readers can benefit from this resource.

Depuis un certain moment, ce blog reste muet -- non pas parce qu'il n'y a rien à dire, mais plutôt l'invers : les événements se succèdent un peu trop vite. L'actualité au maghreb (et au sahel) me fait découvrir des lacunes des connaissances du fond et du contexte. Alors, je me lance dans une nouvelle aventure. Ayant décrochée un poste dans unebibliothèque universitaire, j'ai accès à toute une panoplie des ouvrages, dont je choisirai les plus intéressants pour en faire de brèves critiques. Affaire à suivre et profitez-en!

Single mothers in Tunisia

Your blogger translated this in-depth report about single mothers and the work of the Amal Association in Tunisia.

It's useful that Nawaat includes these kinds of dossiers (Society, Economy) as well as the up to the minute political content. Many people, even those who may have visited Tunisia on holiday, don't know very much about the country, or only know what they see in headlines. Nawaat helps fill that void and your blogger is proud to help, even if the contribution is minute.

Who gets to interpret religion?

Hannah Armstrong, who is a Institute of Current World Affairs fellow in the Sahel and someone your blogger follow enthusiastically on Twitter (@HannahHaniya), wrote another interesting piece on Mali in the New York Times.

She contrasts the violent, authoritarian attitude of the various jihadi groups in Northern Mali with the gentler tactics of the High Council of Islam:

who uniformly decry violence and defend the importance of working alongside the Malian state — unlike the jihadis up north. And unlike the Gulf-inspired radicalism of those jihadis, the H.C.I. groups together Muslims of wide-ranging ideologies. Some represent the local brand of Sufism, for which music, fetishes and gender mixing are quite ordinary; others subscribe to the conservative Wahhabi strain of Islam, an import from Saudi Arabia.

While some of the comments on her piece took issue with the statements of one of the cheikhs she interviewed, the role that religion takes in public life is an important and complicated issue, throughout the MENA region (and related territories, like Mali). The controversy in Mali over celebrating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday mirrors similar tensions elsewhere, much as religious firebrands destroy saints' mausoleums from Timbuktu to Tunis.

While recent turmoil in Egypt has tarnished Western views of the Muslim Brotherhood, this doesn't mean that religious leaders can't play a useful and constructive role in the civil society of Muslim countries. However, these leaders are a varied group and there is no single version of what Islam is, or how religion and politics should co-exist. Hannah's points are interesting, and the questions her piece raises about the Arab-centric nature of Muslim discourse and its racist undercurrents warrant further investigation:

One Malian recently tweeted ... : “These Arab Islamists are racists for they only conceive of Islam as being by Arabs, blacks are just second class.” He, like most black southern Malians, who overwhelmingly support the intervention, do not grant Arab countries a monopoly on the interpretation of Islam. They favor their own version, leavened by pluralism and compromise-seeking.

How We Can Mimize the Chance of Future Tragedies

In the wake of the shooting in Newtown, myriad theories have been trotted out to the tragedy, and an even wider selection of solutions proposed to prevent similar attacks. Because America is so atypical in terms of gun violence, we focus on what these killers do and not what drives them to do so. And while the gun issue is serious, our focus should be on bringing disaffected young men into the fold and removing the factors that cause them to snap.

It is not an accident that most of these atrocities are committed by men, nor that their frequency is increasing. And while they may be hard to profile, we can still do something about it. Dr. Michael Stone of the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York City explains: “People usually don’t commit mass murder more than once. Usually you’re dealing with an angry, dissatisfied person who has poor social skills or few friends, and then there is a trigger that sets them off.”

Let's focus on that characterization: angry and dissatisfied with poor social skills. There is a link between poor social skills and depression and both of these factors seem to be at play with mass killers. Further, men struggle with depression differently from women and have trouble seeking help. However, among the healthy coping mechanisms suggested are support from friends and family and taking part in enoyable activites.

Discussing gender gets complicated quickly, and brings out strong feelings. As a variety of commentators have pointed out, changes in our society are difficult for men, who suffer from what they perceive as giving up some of their entitlements. Yet proposing anything geared toward men provokes a defensive reaction from women, who justifiably fear losing their gains. Any viable solution, therefore, needs to address men's needs without shortchanging women.

Here are three concrete suggestions to improve men's social skills and reduce the frequency of tragic violent incidents:

• Expand educational and training opportunities. While a college education is useful for those who succeed academically, it may not be the best choice for everyone. Training programs that provide skills needed for employment would play an important role in preparing men for jobs.

• Increase recreational opportunities for youth and adults. Evidence suggests that engaging in sporting activities has a positive effect on psychosocial health, particularly for people who are depressed.

• Decrease the emphasis on drug crimes in the justice system. Many people in jail on drug charges do not necessarily pose a threat to others. Limiting incarceration for these kinds of crimes would cut down on pulling families apart, refocus police resources, and prevent non-violent offenders from being exposed to criminal networks in prison.

While these three initiatives are designed to support men, they would also benefit women. Training and apprenticeship programs help prepare people for a changing job market. And men and women alike can improve their health, happiness and create social bonds through recreational activities. Finally, while keeping non-violent offenders out of jail would help these men by allowing them to remain employed, it would also help their families, especially by making them available to their children and more stable partners for their spouses.

These measures would not completely eliminate tragic, violent incidents. It's unrealistic to believe there is any kind of panacea. However, responses that don't address the root of the problem will do less good than the initiatives proposed above, and might do more harm. Although it requires funds and effort, using these resources for a constructive purpose now is better than using them later to respond to tragedy.

Friend or Foe?

There's an interesting piece of analysis in the New York Times about rising Sunni power in the Middle East. 

It focuses on Egypt, Turkey and Qatar and the role they play in countering the so-called "Shia Crescent", of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. And while it's true that power is shifting in the Middle East, choosing to side with emerging powers is not the best move for the US or European allies.

Your blogger responded to the article in the comments section:

A longer view of who is an ally and who is enemy shows that none of these situations is immutable. Iran was a close ally under the Shah, but not as the Islamic Republic. However, the mistake is interpret a link between religious governments and anti-American sentiment that does not take into account American actions. If populations vote for Islamist parties, it means those parties were able to appeal to enough people to win an election.
The question is why they are appealing and part of why is that secular leaders, often in concert with America, were often a disaster, enriching themselves while failing to develop their countries, repressing their populations, and leading many of their citizens to feel powerless and humiliated. Choosing an alternative (which is usually Islamist, since dictators made organizing other opposition next to impossible) is a way for them make their voices heard and maybe secure governments more responsive to the needs of their population.
While none of this augurs a situation where these countries are close American allies, nothing prevents useful cooperation on areas of shared interest, which might be better for the US in the long run, anyway.

The article does question US relations with leaders in the changing Middle East, but it continues to assume that American governments should and will exercise influence over these leaders.

Clearly the old leaders Washington relied on to enforce its will, like President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, are gone or at least eclipsed. But otherwise confusion reigns in terms of knowing how to deal with this new paradigm, one that could well create societies infused with religious ideology that Americans find difficult to accept. The new reality could be a weaker Iran, but a far more religiously conservative Middle East that is less beholden to the United States.

If newly elected governments in the Middle East are more conservative, that reflects the choice of their populations. Now, there is a big difference between voting for an alternative and that vote signaling a mandate to implement widespread social changes, as opposition in Egypt and Tunisia demonstrates.

Your blogger also takes issue with the way that anti-American sentiment and religious conservatism are linked. Islamists are not nearly so concerned with how Americans live their lives at home as they are with US Foreign Policy's effects on their lives. Thus, being religious does not make someone anti-American, but suffering the effects of American policies may drive Middle Easterners to identify more closely with their religion.

Currently, populations in the Middle East are debating the role religion should play in government and more broadly in society. Although this debate is not new (there is a great deal of scholarly writing on the subject, throughout Islamic history and not just the 19th Century thinkers whose influence is still important), the difference today is that it is more democratic. Higher levels of literacy and the interconnectedness that technology makes possible allow a far greater number of people to take part in the discussion.

However, this is not a discussion that the US should expect to influence directly. There is a large difference between a useful exchange of ideas and a heavy-handed imposition of norms.  Many of the freedoms that underpin the American constitution do serve as an inspiration for people the world over, but how they choose to protect them is their business. 

The best course is for Western powers to avoid being too closely bound with any Middle Eastern governments. Where cooperation is possible, working together should be encouraged, but taking sides, either with particular leaders, or with one faction against another risks not only embroiling the US in conflicts we do not fully understand, but also further hurts our reputation abroad and adds legitimacy to anti-American sentiments.

And if that didn't convince you, there's a hilarious send-up of the Iran-Contra scandal from American Dad that demonstrates the pitfalls of taking sides and being overly involved in the internal affairs of other countries:



Update: Juan Cole also wrote a piece about the same issue, although less America-focused. Here are what he sees as the biggest changes from a US perspective:

A Sunni-dominated Levant would not necessarily be hostile to the US, though it is likely to bear some grudges for US inaction in Syria. But it would likely be severely hostile to Israel. A galvanized Syrian population and a revolutionary government, plus their support for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, could introduce dangerous new frictions, at a time when the Likud Party in Israel is moving even further to the right. Increased Syrian-Israel tension is likely to be one outcome. A strengthened Hamas might well be another (Hamas is realigning away from Syria-Iran and toward Egypt-FSA).

The Family Theory

Right now, it's hard to say very much intelligent about the MENA political situation since events are unfolding so quickly.

However, your blogger has several meta-thoughts about people and how they relate and interact.

THE FAMILY THEORY

The first is what she has tentatively dubbed the "family theory of politics." A major shortcoming of Political Science is that, by focusing on strategy, it forgets the human emotional component of politics. This has enduring relevance, since both governments and populations make decisions based on criteria other than strategic calculations. For instance, your blogger holds that the consensus on Iran is incorrect. Instead, the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons is mostly about pride and claiming a particular identity and that although Iran has tensions with Israel, they are not really interested in the losses associated with a war.

But in the same vein, pride and hurt feelings play a very large role in international politics. For instance, in the relationships between countries, tone counts a lot. Good advice is meaningless if the way it's delivered denigrates the receiving country. Or even more fundamentally, many leaders, like teenagers, just don't like being told what to do. In fact, even if what they're being told is in their interest, their emotional response may lead them to act differently.

Additionally, "family theory" is applicable to the relationship between allies. Often, the relationship between allies is similar to the one between a parent and a child. Whether or not it should be more a relationship between equals is another question entirely. Yet, in the same way that a good parents encourages a child's independence and self-sufficiency, so too should the "parent" country. Often, the United States plays the role of an over-involved parent. Instead of letting the "child" country take care of its own affairs, the US continues to be involved, day-to-day. Soon, any gratefulness dissipates, and the "child" country begins to feel resentment. Of course, the United States is not the only nation that plays this role, but it is arguably the most visible.

Another aspect of the "family theory" is the idea of apologizing versus infallibility. Candidate Romney has used  President Obama's handling the offensive film/Libya attack as an example of his weakness, and his apparent lack of pride in American exceptionalism. However, it is unhelpful to take the attitude that every action is correct. Parents generally want what is best for their children, and they act accordingly. And yet, sometimes they make the wrong decision. When they do, it's better to deal with the wrong decision honestly. Otherwise, resentment will fester and grow.

Previous Revolutions

To go out with a bang from her current job, your blogger wrote an article about an item here in Philadelphia that resonates with current debates about rights and the will of the people.

One thing that gets complicated in the spread of ideas is who owns the idea and how the ideas are transmitted. For instance, many revolutionary ideals, most obviously liberty, equality and fraternity, are closely identified with the French Revolution. The narrative of class struggle often uses the Russian Revolution as a jumping off point. Both of these ideas perceive and present themselves as universal, even if they are often interpreted differently according to location.

And yet, there is a good deal of push-back. For instance, in the Maghreb, political parties need to tread carefully when they espouse "European" ideals, or risk being identified as the "hizba faransa" and labeled as traitors. And there is plenty of talk of "cultural imperialism." However, there is a difference between forcing a system onto an unstable state, and benefiting from a free exchange of ideas. Colonialism understandably makes some people wary of ideas, but it would be unwise to dismiss them out of hand.

Of course, not everyone goes around in their daily life comparing political systems. It might, in fact, be helpful to focus on what themes systems have in common, instead of pitting them against one another. Unfortunately, as the Poetic Politico points out, sometimes people in power view this as a threat, instead of considering that it might provide a useful lens for people experiencing a painful transition.

Putting History to Work

In general, your blogger tries to stay away from responding to columns and articles that don't deal with the core themes of the blog. However, this Brooks column in the Times paints a drastically edited vision of American History that obscures the interesting shades of gray. Since your blogger maintains that good decisions (and good policy) can only be made with good information, it is important to develop a more nuanced world view.

Earlier this week, David Brooks wrote a column in the New York Times entitled “Why our Elites Stink.” He claimed that in that past, our country was led by a male WASP elite who had a leadership code, and that our current meritocratic elite does not, and this is the root of the lack of confidence in our institutions. My quarrel isn't with his conclusion, which is a separate issue, but on the purported historical facts.

Both of the main premises are inaccurate. First, the historical WASP elite were far from paragons of virtue. And second, and perhaps more important other, more diverse elites are not new, they are just more visible.

A quick survey of the 19th and early 20th century reveals scandals of every kind. From playboy Harry K. Thaw's murder of the architect Stanford White, to the custody battle over Gloria Vanderbilt's inheritance, the WASP elite were engaged in all kinds of embarrassing and scandalous behavior in their private lives. However, their public lives could be equally problematic. William Randolph Hearst engaged in “yellow journalism” in order to increase sales and gain an edge over Joseph Pulitzer's publications and was involved in the notoriously corrupt New York political machine Tammany Hall. John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil is the textbook example of a monopoly and the justification for anti-trust laws. Many other household names were also “robber barons,” including J.P Morgan, Andrew Mellon, and Daniel Drew.

Part of what Brooks is getting at when he references their code is that many of these men were philanthropists, who lent their names and their fortunes to colleges, hospitals, and other public institutions. And yet, biographer Ron Chernow explains, in his 1998 book Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., that the two traits can coexist: “What makes [Rockefeller] problematic—and why he continues to inspire ambivalent reactions—is that his good side was every bit as good as his bad side was bad. Seldom has history produced such a contradictory figure.” While he may be the archetype, many other similar figures also embodied these two contradictory traits, contributing large amounts of money to worthy causes while simultaneously engaging in questionable and unethical behavior.

So much for the vaunted code of the WASP elite. But Brooks' other premise is also flawed. He asserts:

“Through most of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Protestant Establishment sat atop the American power structure. A relatively small network of white Protestant men dominated the universities, the world of finance, the local country clubs and even high government service.”

True, a network of white Protestant men exercised a great deal of power, but they were not the only network at the time, they were simply the most visible. Brooks' completely disregards the role of non-WASP elites in American History, including African-Americans, Jews, Catholics, women, and various ethnic groups.

In parallel with mainstream WASP institutions, other groups established colleges and universities, hospitals, and mutual aid societies, and were able to reach positions of power in government, business and the media. When African-Americans, women, Catholics and Jews were not welcome or faced quotas in admissions, they created their own. These institutions gave them access to education and the accompanying social mobility. Additionally, at mainstream institutions where they were considered outsiders, these minority groups created support networks, such as the black and Jewish fraternities, Alpha Phi Alpha and Alpha Epsilon Pi. Often, prominent men can be traced to these networks, similarly to the famous women, from Frances Perkins to Admiral Grace Hopper to Hillary Rodham Clinton, who, until recently, were predominately graduates of women's colleges.

The non-Protestant elites who were able to rise to power despite the odds are certainly admirable. Today, there are fewer formal barriers to entry, though prejudice and discrimination continue to exist. So what point does Brooks want to make? He says:

“...as this meritocratic elite has taken over institutions, trust in them has plummeted. It’s not even clear that the brainy elite is doing a better job of running them than the old boys’ network. Would we say that Wall Street is working better now than it did 60 years ago? Or government? The system is more just, but the outcomes are mixed. The meritocracy has not fulfilled its promise.”

What promise does he mean? That diversity engendered by meritocracy in positions of authority would somehow magically make them function without difficulty? That everyone would be virtuous and trustworthy? I've established that they were not in the past, and that privilege did not guarantee probity. Our current system is not perfect, but no system will be. At least our current one has the benefit of being more representative of our country as a whole, and not shutting out eager and competent people based on their membership in less favored groups. Our problems will not be solved by a return to a mythical past. Brooks' Golden Age illusion is just that; an illusion.

Another Letter in the Times

Recently the New York Times Magazine published a feature on Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. Secretary Clinton has been showing up in the media often, whether the subject is analysis of her tenure at State, or the possibility of another presidential candidacy in the future.

Your blogger has an issue with the tone and attitude of some of the comments reported about Secretary Clinton:

I’m tired of this meme, oft-repeated in these pages, about Hillary Clinton being “dutiful” and “a Girl Scout.” Being a committed, honorable public servant willing to work in a collegial way with your rivals should not be characterized as either someone’s loyal hound or as a teenage girl (despite all the respect and admiration I feel for the Girl Scouts as an organization). The people who choose to describe Clinton this way are showing their bias, their entitlement and more than a little poor judgment.

This doesn't mean your blogger agrees with all of Secretary Clinton's decisions. However, there is a difference between policy decisions and the way she conducts herself with her employees, with the President, and with other members of the Administration. While she should not just tow the President's line, it is far better to discuss and compromise than to erupt into an embarrassing battle of egos.

Note: This blog references the New York Times often. While your blogger consults other domestic papers, international news sources, specialized publications and blogs, there is value in paying close attention to the U.S. paper of record. Despite some limitations, including unselfconscious privilege, the Times remains a platform for both reporting and opinion makers.

A Bold Idea for Syria

Turkey + Syria = a way out?

Eighteen months ago, all kinds of people had opinions about how Syria wouldn't be swept up in the Arab Spring, and said things about Syria needing a strong leader to enforce unity. That didn't work out they way some people expected. The MENA region today is far from what most people imagined a scant two years ago and is still in flux. Anything can happen.Commentators are often faulted for criticizing and not proposing solutions. Your blogger enjoys an exercise in creative problem solving, so here's a far-outside-the-box idea for Syria.

Let's consider some of the problems facing Syria and any transition scenario:

• Syria has some perceived unsavory allies, including Russia and Iran, as well as Hezbollah
• Syria is riven with ethnic and Sectarian divides: Kurds, Alawites, Christians, Druze.
• Alawite domination and army control create the possibility of purges and revanchism in the case of a transition.
• Syria has a young, poor population and significant economic problems. Additionally, Syria is not well integrated into international governance structures.

To remedy these problems, Syria should affiliate with Turkey. The actual adhesion process would need to be negotiated, although the Syrian territory could be grafted onto the Turkish province and district system without too much trouble, especially since the train systems link up. Of course, this couldn't happen without the Syrian population being consulted, ideally through a referendum.

Here is what Syria could gain by affiliating with Turkey:

• Access to Turkey's growing and diversified economy. Syria's economy is dominated by state-run industry, and who controls these industries following a transition is a problem. Opening them up to bids from Turkish business would allow integration into Turkey's economy and would spread gains both within Turkey and Syria, helping to alleviate Syria's high unemployment.
• Access to Turkey's institutions, including multi-party democracy, independent judiciary, and educational system. Also to Turkey's status in international organizations like NATO, OECD and the G-20. This would avoid the necessity of building these institutions and institutional relationships from scratch and would ease Syrians' transition by allowing them to adapt incrementally to pre-existing institutions instead of creating their own from scratch.
• Merging with Turkey would prevent an Iraq-style sectarian revenge. Although Alawites would not longer hold their dominant position, they would be replaced by existing Turkish institutions, which Syrians could join, instead of by revanchist Sunni Muslim groups, Islamist or not.
• Integrating the remaining Syrian Army with the Turkish Army would provide an appropriate outlet for military skills and would prevent them from seeking mercenary employment elsewhere or joining insurgent groups.

And here's what Turkey could gain from Syria's adhesion.

• Turkey would gain more coastline (to Tartus), access to a long stretch of the Euphrates, and to Syria's oil and natural gas deposits.
• Turkey would gain 22 million new citizens. Prime Minister Erdogan has made comments about the need for Turkey to have a young and dynamic population to sustain economic growth and development.
• Turkey could expand its historical tourism business to include sites in Syria, continue various Syrian cultural festivals, and expand its status as a cultural capital, using Syrian artists and writers to appeal to its Arab neighbors.
• The added Syrian population and land area would enhance Turkey's strategic importance, especially as a bridge to the Arab/Muslim world.

Then, what are the drawbacks to Syria?

• Clearly, Syria would be giving up sovereignty.
• Local elites and civil service employees would lose their status once absorbed into Turkey.
• Closer adhesion with Turkey would destabilize Syrian ties with erstwhile allies like Russia and Iran.

And what about drawbacks for Turkey?

• In the short term, all the new citizens would be a drain on Turkish resources.
• The presence of Syria's Kurds could exacerbate Turkey's issues with its own Kurds and with the PKK.
• Adding Syria's territory and its border with Israel could heighten Turkish tensions with Israel.
• Syria's population currently also includes a significant proportion of Iraqi refugees, who would then become Turkey's problem
• There is the risk of Syria's sectarian tensions spilling over into Turkey.
• Turkey would have to deal with issues like whether Syria had a nuclear program (the nuclear facility that Israel took out in the early 2000s).

These are probably not the only drawbacks. However, other scenarios have greater, more serious drawbacks.

It might seem strange to float the idea of merging Syria and Turkey. What about Syria's pride and national identity? What about the obvious difference like language? Those obstacles exist, but if the same lines of thinking only lead to disintegration and chaos, what's the harm in considering an idea out of left field?

Addendum: Later in June, Syria shot down a Turkish plane. While this doesn't kill the arguments presented here, one does have to wonder what the Turkish plane was doing in Syrian airspace.

Quel changement sous la présidence Hollande?

Installé depuis peu, et en periode de bac, le gouvernment Hollande a abrogé le fameux ciculaire Guéant qui embêtait tant les étudiants étangers.

Ceci est une bonne chose. Il était pas du tout souhaitable de renvoyer les étudiants qui ont battu pour avoir leur place en France dans l'attente d'y trouver un travail. Cela risque fort de désillusionner des gens qui étaient jusqu'à là favorables et attachés à la France et de créer de la rancune.

La justification du gouvernement sortant était en quelque sort que "l'Afrique avait besoin de ses diplômés", plus que la France.

Mais cette perspective ne comprend pas tout. Le probleme du "brain drain" étant réelle, il fallait néanmoins s'interroger sur les mobiles qui amènent des étrangers à faire leurs études en France.

En premier, il y a la qualité des institutions universitaire, qui, quoi que discutable, est souvent plus élévée que la plupart des universités dans leur pays d'origine. Il y a aussi la question de liberté, surveillance,  et censure, qui pourrait s'imposer dans certaines domaines.

Mais, au dela des ces considérations, il faut bien comprendre les enjeux dans les pays d'origine. Accéder a la faculté n'est qu'une étape. Après avoir obtenu un diplôme, la recherche d'un emploi se présente souvent difficile a cause de corruption. Faute du réseau ou des moyens pour graisser des pattes, un diplôme ne recolte que le désespoir. Obtenir un diplôme à l'étranger est aussi lié avec le possibilité de se faire embaucher à l'étranger, donc de créer un réseau professionnel, et de pouvoir compenser les inégalités du pays d'origine.

On peut reprocher au nouveau réglement qu'il ne change pas grand chose. En fait, il est possible de faire la même reproche par rapport aux changements policières et judiciaires de garde à vue pour les sans-papiers en France. Ces reproches contiennent une part de vérité, car la situation des étrangers, doctorants ou sans-papiers, reste toujours difficile. Cependant, le quinquennat Hollande voulait se démarquer de celui de Sarkozy, qui était hostile envers les étrangers.

Alors, un bon coup de pub pour Hollande, mais il faut attendre encore pour voir s'il s'agit de vrais changements ou ce n'est que de la poudre aux yeux.

What Hollande means for France, through the New Yorker's eyes

Sometimes your blogger finds it useful, and less depressing, to take a different spin on world events. And so, to look over what Adam Gopnik of the New Yorker thinks of France's new president, François Hollande. Since so much of the coverage of the elections in the American press focused on the mistaken idea that Hollande's mild manner somehow meant he was inexperienced, Gopnik's more nuanced view-point was a pleasant surprise.

He made several points, worth considering:

• Hollande is a sort of anti-Sarkozy. While Americans might be comfortable with Sarkozy, may French people are less so. “Sarkozy seemed merely showy, and his energy, over time, merely antic and self-pleasing.”

Elections are decided not only on the merits of the candidates' programs, but also on how they are perceived. While Sarkozy promised changes, French voters were not pleased by his period in office and also important, were not pleased by the image he gave of their country.

• “Professional worriers worry about the prominence of the political extremes in France—and it’s hard not to worry when their parties take a third of the vote—but that vote wasn’t quite as large, or as big a deal, as it might seem.” Gopnik considers Le Pen and Mélenchon, and their seemingly extreme ideas.

Part of how Americans see politics in other countries is influenced by their familiarity with the two-party system and the fact that it seems to be the “normal” and others are an aberration. Now, there is no reason that everyone needs to have a two-party system, and as various pundits mention regularly in the New York Times, having such a system leads to polarization and makes compromise more difficult. As much as some of Le Pen's public statements may be incendiary or racist, the presence of extremes in the French electoral field is only important if their agenda is implemented, an issue of concern in Sarkozy's politics, particularly towards immigrants.

• Then Gopnik raises a good point: “What would an actual, honest-to-God Socialist President do in office? Probably not anything particularly socialist—nationalizing the means of production or the like—but, rather, something more along the lines of striking a protective stance.”

Thirty years ago, Mitterrand assumed office and nationalized some industries, but it's hard to imagine that happening today. Other changes might seem slightly more possible; during Mitterrand's term, there was an opening towards diversity, with campaigns like the anti-racist Marche des Beurs in 1983 or “Touche pas à mon pôte.” Since issues concerning the presence of immigrants (or people perceived as immigrants) continues to be a hot-button issue and the Right have played into it, perhaps the election of a Socialist heralds an easing of racial and communitarian tension.

• Then Gopnik plunges into an examination of American schadenfreude at the problems Europe grapples with during the current economic crisis :
  “A continent torn by the two most horrible wars in history achieved a remarkable half century of peace and prosperity, based on a marriage of liberalism properly so called (individual freedoms, including the entrepreneurial kind) and socialism rightly so ordered (as an equitable care for the common good). Any pleasure taken in the failure of Europe to expunge all its demons threatens to become one more way of not having to examine our own. A mild-mannered, European-minded citizen king is, at least, better than a passionately convinced exceptionalist. France, and Europe, learned that lesson the hard way.” 

Hollande has only just taken office and so this blogger will give him the customary hundred days before making any pronouncements on the direction his government is taking. However, of great interest will be how a Socialist-led France deals with the crises of international affairs, and with former colonies and protectorates in particular.