A Bold Idea for Syria

Turkey + Syria = a way out?

Eighteen months ago, all kinds of people had opinions about how Syria wouldn't be swept up in the Arab Spring, and said things about Syria needing a strong leader to enforce unity. That didn't work out they way some people expected. The MENA region today is far from what most people imagined a scant two years ago and is still in flux. Anything can happen.Commentators are often faulted for criticizing and not proposing solutions. Your blogger enjoys an exercise in creative problem solving, so here's a far-outside-the-box idea for Syria.

Let's consider some of the problems facing Syria and any transition scenario:

• Syria has some perceived unsavory allies, including Russia and Iran, as well as Hezbollah
• Syria is riven with ethnic and Sectarian divides: Kurds, Alawites, Christians, Druze.
• Alawite domination and army control create the possibility of purges and revanchism in the case of a transition.
• Syria has a young, poor population and significant economic problems. Additionally, Syria is not well integrated into international governance structures.

To remedy these problems, Syria should affiliate with Turkey. The actual adhesion process would need to be negotiated, although the Syrian territory could be grafted onto the Turkish province and district system without too much trouble, especially since the train systems link up. Of course, this couldn't happen without the Syrian population being consulted, ideally through a referendum.

Here is what Syria could gain by affiliating with Turkey:

• Access to Turkey's growing and diversified economy. Syria's economy is dominated by state-run industry, and who controls these industries following a transition is a problem. Opening them up to bids from Turkish business would allow integration into Turkey's economy and would spread gains both within Turkey and Syria, helping to alleviate Syria's high unemployment.
• Access to Turkey's institutions, including multi-party democracy, independent judiciary, and educational system. Also to Turkey's status in international organizations like NATO, OECD and the G-20. This would avoid the necessity of building these institutions and institutional relationships from scratch and would ease Syrians' transition by allowing them to adapt incrementally to pre-existing institutions instead of creating their own from scratch.
• Merging with Turkey would prevent an Iraq-style sectarian revenge. Although Alawites would not longer hold their dominant position, they would be replaced by existing Turkish institutions, which Syrians could join, instead of by revanchist Sunni Muslim groups, Islamist or not.
• Integrating the remaining Syrian Army with the Turkish Army would provide an appropriate outlet for military skills and would prevent them from seeking mercenary employment elsewhere or joining insurgent groups.

And here's what Turkey could gain from Syria's adhesion.

• Turkey would gain more coastline (to Tartus), access to a long stretch of the Euphrates, and to Syria's oil and natural gas deposits.
• Turkey would gain 22 million new citizens. Prime Minister Erdogan has made comments about the need for Turkey to have a young and dynamic population to sustain economic growth and development.
• Turkey could expand its historical tourism business to include sites in Syria, continue various Syrian cultural festivals, and expand its status as a cultural capital, using Syrian artists and writers to appeal to its Arab neighbors.
• The added Syrian population and land area would enhance Turkey's strategic importance, especially as a bridge to the Arab/Muslim world.

Then, what are the drawbacks to Syria?

• Clearly, Syria would be giving up sovereignty.
• Local elites and civil service employees would lose their status once absorbed into Turkey.
• Closer adhesion with Turkey would destabilize Syrian ties with erstwhile allies like Russia and Iran.

And what about drawbacks for Turkey?

• In the short term, all the new citizens would be a drain on Turkish resources.
• The presence of Syria's Kurds could exacerbate Turkey's issues with its own Kurds and with the PKK.
• Adding Syria's territory and its border with Israel could heighten Turkish tensions with Israel.
• Syria's population currently also includes a significant proportion of Iraqi refugees, who would then become Turkey's problem
• There is the risk of Syria's sectarian tensions spilling over into Turkey.
• Turkey would have to deal with issues like whether Syria had a nuclear program (the nuclear facility that Israel took out in the early 2000s).

These are probably not the only drawbacks. However, other scenarios have greater, more serious drawbacks.

It might seem strange to float the idea of merging Syria and Turkey. What about Syria's pride and national identity? What about the obvious difference like language? Those obstacles exist, but if the same lines of thinking only lead to disintegration and chaos, what's the harm in considering an idea out of left field?

Addendum: Later in June, Syria shot down a Turkish plane. While this doesn't kill the arguments presented here, one does have to wonder what the Turkish plane was doing in Syrian airspace.

What's different in Algeria/ Qu'est-ce qui distingue l'Algérie?

Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, commentators have been speculating which countries will experience similar uprisings, how governments will respond, and what motivates citizens to rise up. Against the backdrop of ousted leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, civil war in Libya and stirring unrest in Morocco, why has Algeria remained relatively calm?

On the Foreign Policy Middle East Channel, Lahcen Achy advances five characteristics that differentiate the protest movement in Algeria from its neighbors.

• The people do not have a shared set of grievances.
• The opposition forces are divided among themselves and regulations prevent the organization of protests.
• The security forces in Algeria are large and strong.
• The military is integrated into the political and business power structure, so a change of president makes little difference.
• People are still suffering from the traumatic effects of the civil war in the 1990s.

Achy admits that none of this makes change impossible in Algeria, simply that “in spite of the sporadic demonstrations and of the calls for change from prominent intellectuals and political figures, a unifying movement that transcends societal divisions is yet to be seen in Algeria.”

Much has been made of the characteristics that Tunisia and Egypt share (incidentally also with Iran) but now the movement has spread across a variety of countries all across the Middle East. For instance, while Egypt and Tunisia had cohesive historical identities, the same cannot be said for Yemen, nor for Syria. Tunisia has a relatively small and homogenous population, while Egypt has the largest, and a significant Coptic Christian minority. Algeria's population is also relatively large and diverse. While Tunisia's population is relatively affluent and middle-class, this does not hold true in other countries.

The only factor Achy mentions that may really have a durable effect is the legacy of the civil war. Other countries have experienced terrorism and atrocities, like the Hama massacre in Syria, but a civil war is different from even the most repressive tactics of a dictator. Having turned against one another in recent memory, it is understandable that they would want to avoid repeating the same situation.

Depuis le début du Printemps Arabe, les experts cherchent à discerner quel serait le prochain pays à se revolter, la réaction des dirigeants, et c'est quoi exactement qui pousse des citoyens jusqu'à là reprimés à agir. Entouré par des drames poltiques, le départ des dictateurs en Tunisie et en Egypte, la guerre en Libye, et la montée de contestation au Maroc, pourquoi l'Algérie reste relativement calme?

Sous la rubrique “Moyen Orient” de la revue “Foreign Policy”, Lahcen Achy signale cinq traits qui differencie le mouvement protestataire algérien de celui de ses voisins.

• Le peuple ne partage pas des doléances communes.
• Les forces de l'opposition ne sont pas réunis et sont limités dans leur capacité d'organiser et de se manifester.
• Les forces de l'ordre sont nombreux et puissants.
• Les responsables militaires sont bien integrés dans les milieux politiques et commerciales, diminuant l'importance de la fonction présidentielle.
• Le traumatisme de la guerre civile reste dans les esprits.

Selon Achy, rien n'empêche un mouvement révolutionnair de déclencher en Algérie, mais “malgré des manifestations sporadiques et des appels au changement de la part des intellectuels et des hommes politiques, un bloc qui pourrait dépasser les divisions sociétales n'existe pas encore en Algérie.”

On parle beaucoup des caracterstiques que partagent la Tunisie et l'Egypte (et l'Iran d'ailleurs) mais maintenant que le mouvement prend ampleur et gangne plusieurs autres pays au Moyen Orient. Par exemple, tandis que la Tunisie et l'Egypte jouissent des indentités historiques cohésives, il n'en est pas ainsi pour le Yemen ni la Syrie. Un pays relativement petit, et d'une population homogène, la Tunisie se differencie de l'Egypt, avec ses 85 millions et sa minorité coptique assez importante. De manière analogue, la population algérienne comporte les Kabyles dans ses 35 millions. En fin, l'affluence relative et la place occupée par les couches moyennes en Tunisie se manifestent peu dans la région.

Le seul indice signalé par Achy qui peut jouer un rôle déterminant est la mémoire de la guerre civile. Bien que d'autres pays aient subi de terrorisme et des atrocités, comme le massacre de Hama en Syrie, une guerre civile dépasse même les tactiques les plus répressives d'un dictateur. Ayant vu la population s'en prend aux autres, le risque de faire reproduire la sitaution pèse lourd.