Friend or Foe?

There's an interesting piece of analysis in the New York Times about rising Sunni power in the Middle East. 

It focuses on Egypt, Turkey and Qatar and the role they play in countering the so-called "Shia Crescent", of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. And while it's true that power is shifting in the Middle East, choosing to side with emerging powers is not the best move for the US or European allies.

Your blogger responded to the article in the comments section:

A longer view of who is an ally and who is enemy shows that none of these situations is immutable. Iran was a close ally under the Shah, but not as the Islamic Republic. However, the mistake is interpret a link between religious governments and anti-American sentiment that does not take into account American actions. If populations vote for Islamist parties, it means those parties were able to appeal to enough people to win an election.
The question is why they are appealing and part of why is that secular leaders, often in concert with America, were often a disaster, enriching themselves while failing to develop their countries, repressing their populations, and leading many of their citizens to feel powerless and humiliated. Choosing an alternative (which is usually Islamist, since dictators made organizing other opposition next to impossible) is a way for them make their voices heard and maybe secure governments more responsive to the needs of their population.
While none of this augurs a situation where these countries are close American allies, nothing prevents useful cooperation on areas of shared interest, which might be better for the US in the long run, anyway.

The article does question US relations with leaders in the changing Middle East, but it continues to assume that American governments should and will exercise influence over these leaders.

Clearly the old leaders Washington relied on to enforce its will, like President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, are gone or at least eclipsed. But otherwise confusion reigns in terms of knowing how to deal with this new paradigm, one that could well create societies infused with religious ideology that Americans find difficult to accept. The new reality could be a weaker Iran, but a far more religiously conservative Middle East that is less beholden to the United States.

If newly elected governments in the Middle East are more conservative, that reflects the choice of their populations. Now, there is a big difference between voting for an alternative and that vote signaling a mandate to implement widespread social changes, as opposition in Egypt and Tunisia demonstrates.

Your blogger also takes issue with the way that anti-American sentiment and religious conservatism are linked. Islamists are not nearly so concerned with how Americans live their lives at home as they are with US Foreign Policy's effects on their lives. Thus, being religious does not make someone anti-American, but suffering the effects of American policies may drive Middle Easterners to identify more closely with their religion.

Currently, populations in the Middle East are debating the role religion should play in government and more broadly in society. Although this debate is not new (there is a great deal of scholarly writing on the subject, throughout Islamic history and not just the 19th Century thinkers whose influence is still important), the difference today is that it is more democratic. Higher levels of literacy and the interconnectedness that technology makes possible allow a far greater number of people to take part in the discussion.

However, this is not a discussion that the US should expect to influence directly. There is a large difference between a useful exchange of ideas and a heavy-handed imposition of norms.  Many of the freedoms that underpin the American constitution do serve as an inspiration for people the world over, but how they choose to protect them is their business. 

The best course is for Western powers to avoid being too closely bound with any Middle Eastern governments. Where cooperation is possible, working together should be encouraged, but taking sides, either with particular leaders, or with one faction against another risks not only embroiling the US in conflicts we do not fully understand, but also further hurts our reputation abroad and adds legitimacy to anti-American sentiments.

And if that didn't convince you, there's a hilarious send-up of the Iran-Contra scandal from American Dad that demonstrates the pitfalls of taking sides and being overly involved in the internal affairs of other countries:



Update: Juan Cole also wrote a piece about the same issue, although less America-focused. Here are what he sees as the biggest changes from a US perspective:

A Sunni-dominated Levant would not necessarily be hostile to the US, though it is likely to bear some grudges for US inaction in Syria. But it would likely be severely hostile to Israel. A galvanized Syrian population and a revolutionary government, plus their support for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, could introduce dangerous new frictions, at a time when the Likud Party in Israel is moving even further to the right. Increased Syrian-Israel tension is likely to be one outcome. A strengthened Hamas might well be another (Hamas is realigning away from Syria-Iran and toward Egypt-FSA).

The Family Theory

Right now, it's hard to say very much intelligent about the MENA political situation since events are unfolding so quickly.

However, your blogger has several meta-thoughts about people and how they relate and interact.

THE FAMILY THEORY

The first is what she has tentatively dubbed the "family theory of politics." A major shortcoming of Political Science is that, by focusing on strategy, it forgets the human emotional component of politics. This has enduring relevance, since both governments and populations make decisions based on criteria other than strategic calculations. For instance, your blogger holds that the consensus on Iran is incorrect. Instead, the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons is mostly about pride and claiming a particular identity and that although Iran has tensions with Israel, they are not really interested in the losses associated with a war.

But in the same vein, pride and hurt feelings play a very large role in international politics. For instance, in the relationships between countries, tone counts a lot. Good advice is meaningless if the way it's delivered denigrates the receiving country. Or even more fundamentally, many leaders, like teenagers, just don't like being told what to do. In fact, even if what they're being told is in their interest, their emotional response may lead them to act differently.

Additionally, "family theory" is applicable to the relationship between allies. Often, the relationship between allies is similar to the one between a parent and a child. Whether or not it should be more a relationship between equals is another question entirely. Yet, in the same way that a good parents encourages a child's independence and self-sufficiency, so too should the "parent" country. Often, the United States plays the role of an over-involved parent. Instead of letting the "child" country take care of its own affairs, the US continues to be involved, day-to-day. Soon, any gratefulness dissipates, and the "child" country begins to feel resentment. Of course, the United States is not the only nation that plays this role, but it is arguably the most visible.

Another aspect of the "family theory" is the idea of apologizing versus infallibility. Candidate Romney has used  President Obama's handling the offensive film/Libya attack as an example of his weakness, and his apparent lack of pride in American exceptionalism. However, it is unhelpful to take the attitude that every action is correct. Parents generally want what is best for their children, and they act accordingly. And yet, sometimes they make the wrong decision. When they do, it's better to deal with the wrong decision honestly. Otherwise, resentment will fester and grow.

Previous Revolutions

To go out with a bang from her current job, your blogger wrote an article about an item here in Philadelphia that resonates with current debates about rights and the will of the people.

One thing that gets complicated in the spread of ideas is who owns the idea and how the ideas are transmitted. For instance, many revolutionary ideals, most obviously liberty, equality and fraternity, are closely identified with the French Revolution. The narrative of class struggle often uses the Russian Revolution as a jumping off point. Both of these ideas perceive and present themselves as universal, even if they are often interpreted differently according to location.

And yet, there is a good deal of push-back. For instance, in the Maghreb, political parties need to tread carefully when they espouse "European" ideals, or risk being identified as the "hizba faransa" and labeled as traitors. And there is plenty of talk of "cultural imperialism." However, there is a difference between forcing a system onto an unstable state, and benefiting from a free exchange of ideas. Colonialism understandably makes some people wary of ideas, but it would be unwise to dismiss them out of hand.

Of course, not everyone goes around in their daily life comparing political systems. It might, in fact, be helpful to focus on what themes systems have in common, instead of pitting them against one another. Unfortunately, as the Poetic Politico points out, sometimes people in power view this as a threat, instead of considering that it might provide a useful lens for people experiencing a painful transition.

Putting History to Work

In general, your blogger tries to stay away from responding to columns and articles that don't deal with the core themes of the blog. However, this Brooks column in the Times paints a drastically edited vision of American History that obscures the interesting shades of gray. Since your blogger maintains that good decisions (and good policy) can only be made with good information, it is important to develop a more nuanced world view.

Earlier this week, David Brooks wrote a column in the New York Times entitled “Why our Elites Stink.” He claimed that in that past, our country was led by a male WASP elite who had a leadership code, and that our current meritocratic elite does not, and this is the root of the lack of confidence in our institutions. My quarrel isn't with his conclusion, which is a separate issue, but on the purported historical facts.

Both of the main premises are inaccurate. First, the historical WASP elite were far from paragons of virtue. And second, and perhaps more important other, more diverse elites are not new, they are just more visible.

A quick survey of the 19th and early 20th century reveals scandals of every kind. From playboy Harry K. Thaw's murder of the architect Stanford White, to the custody battle over Gloria Vanderbilt's inheritance, the WASP elite were engaged in all kinds of embarrassing and scandalous behavior in their private lives. However, their public lives could be equally problematic. William Randolph Hearst engaged in “yellow journalism” in order to increase sales and gain an edge over Joseph Pulitzer's publications and was involved in the notoriously corrupt New York political machine Tammany Hall. John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil is the textbook example of a monopoly and the justification for anti-trust laws. Many other household names were also “robber barons,” including J.P Morgan, Andrew Mellon, and Daniel Drew.

Part of what Brooks is getting at when he references their code is that many of these men were philanthropists, who lent their names and their fortunes to colleges, hospitals, and other public institutions. And yet, biographer Ron Chernow explains, in his 1998 book Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., that the two traits can coexist: “What makes [Rockefeller] problematic—and why he continues to inspire ambivalent reactions—is that his good side was every bit as good as his bad side was bad. Seldom has history produced such a contradictory figure.” While he may be the archetype, many other similar figures also embodied these two contradictory traits, contributing large amounts of money to worthy causes while simultaneously engaging in questionable and unethical behavior.

So much for the vaunted code of the WASP elite. But Brooks' other premise is also flawed. He asserts:

“Through most of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Protestant Establishment sat atop the American power structure. A relatively small network of white Protestant men dominated the universities, the world of finance, the local country clubs and even high government service.”

True, a network of white Protestant men exercised a great deal of power, but they were not the only network at the time, they were simply the most visible. Brooks' completely disregards the role of non-WASP elites in American History, including African-Americans, Jews, Catholics, women, and various ethnic groups.

In parallel with mainstream WASP institutions, other groups established colleges and universities, hospitals, and mutual aid societies, and were able to reach positions of power in government, business and the media. When African-Americans, women, Catholics and Jews were not welcome or faced quotas in admissions, they created their own. These institutions gave them access to education and the accompanying social mobility. Additionally, at mainstream institutions where they were considered outsiders, these minority groups created support networks, such as the black and Jewish fraternities, Alpha Phi Alpha and Alpha Epsilon Pi. Often, prominent men can be traced to these networks, similarly to the famous women, from Frances Perkins to Admiral Grace Hopper to Hillary Rodham Clinton, who, until recently, were predominately graduates of women's colleges.

The non-Protestant elites who were able to rise to power despite the odds are certainly admirable. Today, there are fewer formal barriers to entry, though prejudice and discrimination continue to exist. So what point does Brooks want to make? He says:

“...as this meritocratic elite has taken over institutions, trust in them has plummeted. It’s not even clear that the brainy elite is doing a better job of running them than the old boys’ network. Would we say that Wall Street is working better now than it did 60 years ago? Or government? The system is more just, but the outcomes are mixed. The meritocracy has not fulfilled its promise.”

What promise does he mean? That diversity engendered by meritocracy in positions of authority would somehow magically make them function without difficulty? That everyone would be virtuous and trustworthy? I've established that they were not in the past, and that privilege did not guarantee probity. Our current system is not perfect, but no system will be. At least our current one has the benefit of being more representative of our country as a whole, and not shutting out eager and competent people based on their membership in less favored groups. Our problems will not be solved by a return to a mythical past. Brooks' Golden Age illusion is just that; an illusion.

Another Letter in the Times

Recently the New York Times Magazine published a feature on Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. Secretary Clinton has been showing up in the media often, whether the subject is analysis of her tenure at State, or the possibility of another presidential candidacy in the future.

Your blogger has an issue with the tone and attitude of some of the comments reported about Secretary Clinton:

I’m tired of this meme, oft-repeated in these pages, about Hillary Clinton being “dutiful” and “a Girl Scout.” Being a committed, honorable public servant willing to work in a collegial way with your rivals should not be characterized as either someone’s loyal hound or as a teenage girl (despite all the respect and admiration I feel for the Girl Scouts as an organization). The people who choose to describe Clinton this way are showing their bias, their entitlement and more than a little poor judgment.

This doesn't mean your blogger agrees with all of Secretary Clinton's decisions. However, there is a difference between policy decisions and the way she conducts herself with her employees, with the President, and with other members of the Administration. While she should not just tow the President's line, it is far better to discuss and compromise than to erupt into an embarrassing battle of egos.

Note: This blog references the New York Times often. While your blogger consults other domestic papers, international news sources, specialized publications and blogs, there is value in paying close attention to the U.S. paper of record. Despite some limitations, including unselfconscious privilege, the Times remains a platform for both reporting and opinion makers.

A Bold Idea for Syria

Turkey + Syria = a way out?

Eighteen months ago, all kinds of people had opinions about how Syria wouldn't be swept up in the Arab Spring, and said things about Syria needing a strong leader to enforce unity. That didn't work out they way some people expected. The MENA region today is far from what most people imagined a scant two years ago and is still in flux. Anything can happen.Commentators are often faulted for criticizing and not proposing solutions. Your blogger enjoys an exercise in creative problem solving, so here's a far-outside-the-box idea for Syria.

Let's consider some of the problems facing Syria and any transition scenario:

• Syria has some perceived unsavory allies, including Russia and Iran, as well as Hezbollah
• Syria is riven with ethnic and Sectarian divides: Kurds, Alawites, Christians, Druze.
• Alawite domination and army control create the possibility of purges and revanchism in the case of a transition.
• Syria has a young, poor population and significant economic problems. Additionally, Syria is not well integrated into international governance structures.

To remedy these problems, Syria should affiliate with Turkey. The actual adhesion process would need to be negotiated, although the Syrian territory could be grafted onto the Turkish province and district system without too much trouble, especially since the train systems link up. Of course, this couldn't happen without the Syrian population being consulted, ideally through a referendum.

Here is what Syria could gain by affiliating with Turkey:

• Access to Turkey's growing and diversified economy. Syria's economy is dominated by state-run industry, and who controls these industries following a transition is a problem. Opening them up to bids from Turkish business would allow integration into Turkey's economy and would spread gains both within Turkey and Syria, helping to alleviate Syria's high unemployment.
• Access to Turkey's institutions, including multi-party democracy, independent judiciary, and educational system. Also to Turkey's status in international organizations like NATO, OECD and the G-20. This would avoid the necessity of building these institutions and institutional relationships from scratch and would ease Syrians' transition by allowing them to adapt incrementally to pre-existing institutions instead of creating their own from scratch.
• Merging with Turkey would prevent an Iraq-style sectarian revenge. Although Alawites would not longer hold their dominant position, they would be replaced by existing Turkish institutions, which Syrians could join, instead of by revanchist Sunni Muslim groups, Islamist or not.
• Integrating the remaining Syrian Army with the Turkish Army would provide an appropriate outlet for military skills and would prevent them from seeking mercenary employment elsewhere or joining insurgent groups.

And here's what Turkey could gain from Syria's adhesion.

• Turkey would gain more coastline (to Tartus), access to a long stretch of the Euphrates, and to Syria's oil and natural gas deposits.
• Turkey would gain 22 million new citizens. Prime Minister Erdogan has made comments about the need for Turkey to have a young and dynamic population to sustain economic growth and development.
• Turkey could expand its historical tourism business to include sites in Syria, continue various Syrian cultural festivals, and expand its status as a cultural capital, using Syrian artists and writers to appeal to its Arab neighbors.
• The added Syrian population and land area would enhance Turkey's strategic importance, especially as a bridge to the Arab/Muslim world.

Then, what are the drawbacks to Syria?

• Clearly, Syria would be giving up sovereignty.
• Local elites and civil service employees would lose their status once absorbed into Turkey.
• Closer adhesion with Turkey would destabilize Syrian ties with erstwhile allies like Russia and Iran.

And what about drawbacks for Turkey?

• In the short term, all the new citizens would be a drain on Turkish resources.
• The presence of Syria's Kurds could exacerbate Turkey's issues with its own Kurds and with the PKK.
• Adding Syria's territory and its border with Israel could heighten Turkish tensions with Israel.
• Syria's population currently also includes a significant proportion of Iraqi refugees, who would then become Turkey's problem
• There is the risk of Syria's sectarian tensions spilling over into Turkey.
• Turkey would have to deal with issues like whether Syria had a nuclear program (the nuclear facility that Israel took out in the early 2000s).

These are probably not the only drawbacks. However, other scenarios have greater, more serious drawbacks.

It might seem strange to float the idea of merging Syria and Turkey. What about Syria's pride and national identity? What about the obvious difference like language? Those obstacles exist, but if the same lines of thinking only lead to disintegration and chaos, what's the harm in considering an idea out of left field?

Addendum: Later in June, Syria shot down a Turkish plane. While this doesn't kill the arguments presented here, one does have to wonder what the Turkish plane was doing in Syrian airspace.

Quel changement sous la présidence Hollande?

Installé depuis peu, et en periode de bac, le gouvernment Hollande a abrogé le fameux ciculaire Guéant qui embêtait tant les étudiants étangers.

Ceci est une bonne chose. Il était pas du tout souhaitable de renvoyer les étudiants qui ont battu pour avoir leur place en France dans l'attente d'y trouver un travail. Cela risque fort de désillusionner des gens qui étaient jusqu'à là favorables et attachés à la France et de créer de la rancune.

La justification du gouvernement sortant était en quelque sort que "l'Afrique avait besoin de ses diplômés", plus que la France.

Mais cette perspective ne comprend pas tout. Le probleme du "brain drain" étant réelle, il fallait néanmoins s'interroger sur les mobiles qui amènent des étrangers à faire leurs études en France.

En premier, il y a la qualité des institutions universitaire, qui, quoi que discutable, est souvent plus élévée que la plupart des universités dans leur pays d'origine. Il y a aussi la question de liberté, surveillance,  et censure, qui pourrait s'imposer dans certaines domaines.

Mais, au dela des ces considérations, il faut bien comprendre les enjeux dans les pays d'origine. Accéder a la faculté n'est qu'une étape. Après avoir obtenu un diplôme, la recherche d'un emploi se présente souvent difficile a cause de corruption. Faute du réseau ou des moyens pour graisser des pattes, un diplôme ne recolte que le désespoir. Obtenir un diplôme à l'étranger est aussi lié avec le possibilité de se faire embaucher à l'étranger, donc de créer un réseau professionnel, et de pouvoir compenser les inégalités du pays d'origine.

On peut reprocher au nouveau réglement qu'il ne change pas grand chose. En fait, il est possible de faire la même reproche par rapport aux changements policières et judiciaires de garde à vue pour les sans-papiers en France. Ces reproches contiennent une part de vérité, car la situation des étrangers, doctorants ou sans-papiers, reste toujours difficile. Cependant, le quinquennat Hollande voulait se démarquer de celui de Sarkozy, qui était hostile envers les étrangers.

Alors, un bon coup de pub pour Hollande, mais il faut attendre encore pour voir s'il s'agit de vrais changements ou ce n'est que de la poudre aux yeux.